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1. Introduction 
Any economic decision or judgment has an associated, often subconscious, psychological 
process prodding it along, in ways that makes the ‘neoclassical ambition of avoiding [this] 
necessity ….unrealizable’ (Simon 1978, 507). The translation of this fundamental statement on 
human behaviour has become associated with the identification of heuristics that individuals use 
to simplify preference construction and hence make choices, or to make the representation of 
what matters relevant, regardless of the degree of complexity as perceived by the decision 
maker and/or the analyst.  
Despite the recognition in behaviour research as far back as the 1950s (see Svenson 1998, 
Gilovich et al. 2002), that cognitive processes have a key role in preference revelation, and the 
reminders throughout the literature (see McFadden 1998, Yoon and Simonson 2008) about rule-
driven behaviour (e.g., Swait and Ben-Akiva 1987, Gilbride and Allenby 2004, Martinez et al. 
2009, Arana et al. 2008, Gabaix and Laibon 2000), we still see relatively little of the belief 
incorporated into stated choice modelling which is, increasingly, becoming the mainstream 
empirical context for preference measurement and willingness to pay derivatives1. 
There is an extensive literature on what might broadly be described as heuristics and biases, and 
which is crystallized in the notion of process, in contrast to outcome. Choice has both elements 
of process and outcome, which in combination represent the endogeneity of choice in stated 
choice studies. The failure to recognise process and the maintenance of a linear additive utility 
expression under full attribute and parameter preservation is an admission, by default, that 
individuals when faced with a stated choice experiment, deem all attributes relevant, and that a 
compensatory decision rule is used to arrive at a choice.  
Although there should be no suggestion that such compensatory rules are always invalid, indeed 
they may be, in aggregate, an acceptable representation or approximation of many process 
circumstances, there is a strong belief that process heterogeneity exists as a consequence of 
mixtures of genuine cognitive processing strategies that simplify decision making in real 
markets, for all manner of reason, and the presence of new states that are introduced through the 
design of choice experiments that are no more than new circumstances to process. Whether the 
processing rules adopted are natural to real choices, or are artifacts of the design of an 
experiment or some other survey instrument (including revealed preference surveys) in front of 
an individual, is in some senses irrelevant; what is relevant is the manner in which such choice 
assessments are processed in respect of the role that each design attribute and the mixture of 
attributes, plays in the outcome. Yoon and Simonson (2008) and Park et al. (2008)2 provide 
some interesting perspectives from marketing research on preference revelation.  
Recent research by Hensher (2006, 2008), Greene and Hensher (2008), Layton and 
Hensher (2008), Hensher and Rose (in press), Hensher and Layton (2008), Hess and 
Hensher (2008), Puckett and Hensher (2008), Swait (2001), Cantillo et al. (2006), 
Cameron (2008), Scarpa et al. (2009,2009a), Beharry and Scarpa (2008), Cantillo and 
Ortúzar (2005), Carlsson et al. (2008), Caussade et al. (2005) and Hensher et al. (2005, 
2009), amongst others, are examples of a growing interest in the way that individuals 
evaluate a package of attributes associated with ordered or unordered alternatives in real 
or hypothetical markets, and make choices3. The accumulating empirical evidence 
suggests that individuals use a number of strategies derived from heuristics, to represent 
the way that information embedded within attributes defining alternatives is used to 
                                                          
1 Consultants still adopt, almost without exception, a full compensatory approach in which all attributes are ‘relevant’. 
2 Park et al. (2008) promotes the idea of starting with a basic product profile and upgrading it one attribute at a time, identifying the 
willingness to pay for that additional attribute given the budgets available. 
3 This paper does not consider other aspects of process in choice experiments such as uncertainty in the choice response. See 
Lundhede et al. (2009). 
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process the context and arrive at a choice outcome. These include cancellation or 
attribute exclusion, degrees of attention paid to attributes in a package of attributes, 
referencing of new or hypothetical attribute packages around a recent or past 
experience, and attribute aggregation where attributes are in common units (see 
Gilovich et al. 2002 for a series of papers that synthesise the evidence under the theme 
of heuristics and biases). Importantly, as shown herein, the heuristics are likely to be 
context specific, such that the nature of the information shown in stated choice 
experiments, for example, conditions the choice of rules adopted.  
Hensher (2006b, 2008) argues that individuals appear to adopt a range of ‘coping’ or 
editing strategies in hypothetical choice settings that are consistent with how they 
normally process information in real markets. Choice experiments have varying 
amounts of information to process, but importantly, aligning ‘choice complexity’ with 
the amount of information to process is potentially misleading. Relevancy is what 
matters (Hensher 2006b)4, and the heuristics adopted by individuals to evaluate a 
circumstance is what needs to be captured through frameworks that can empirically 
identify rules adopted by individuals.  
There are at least two ways in which information on processing might be identified. One 
involves direct questioning of respondents after each choice scenario (what we refer to 
as self-stated intentions); the other involves probabilistic conditions imposed on the 
model form through specification of the utility expressions associated with each 
alternative, that enables inference on the way that specific attributes are processed. Both 
may be complementary. The focus of this paper draws on a stream of active research by 
Hensher, Rose, Puckett, Layton, Greene, Scarpa, and Hess, in which we are 
systematically investigating process rules to establish the behavioural implications on 
marginal willingness to pay5. The functional forms presented herein, as well as 
responses to self-stated intention questions, enable the analyst to infer, up to a 
probability, the presence of some very specific attribute processing strategies such as: 
(i) common metric attribute aggregation, (ii) common-metric parameter transfer, and 
(iii) attribute non-attendance.  
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section a utility-based framework is set 
out in which special cases of attribute processing can be specified, including a latent 
class model that can accommodate all heuristics of current interest. The empirical 
context is then summarised, followed by the empirical analysis, with a focus on 
marginal willingness to pay (WTP). A further section considers the influence that self-
stated intention responses play in WTP when we accept the full validity of such 
evidence. Given concerns about the face validity of self-stated intentions, we consider 
the role that belief functions might play in adjusting the self-stated intentions, so that the 
evidence is more plausible. We conclude with suggestions for ongoing research. 
 
                                                          
4 The emphasis on cognitive load may well be misplaced. Arana et al. (2008) suggest that individual’s cognitive abilities can be 
interrelated with affective and emotional states, i.e., every aspect of human decision making could be seen as simultaneously 
influencing the final outcome of the choice process. They show that complexity effects could be non-significant for 
particular emotional states. 
5 The methods used to identify MWTP also have relevance in the calculation of total WTP. 
2 
Attribute processing, heuristics, and preference construction in choice analysis 
Hensher 
 
2. Incorporating attribute processing heuristics through 
non-linear processing 
2.1 Process I: Common metric attribute aggregation 
In this section we present a utility specification that captures two heuristics  in non-linear 
attribute processing of common-metric attributes over a continuum that accommodates 
6
preservation of attribute partitioning and attribute aggregation7. Importantly, the approach 
allows for mixtures of heuristics within a single model form associated with a sampled 
population, in contrast to the many studies that impose a single heuristic on the entire sample, 
and compare separate models in which each is defined by a single heuristic. A recent study by 
Arana et al. (2008) also considers multiple heuristics. With more than one heuristic within a 
model form, we are able to capture an individual choosing heuristic h with expected payoff 
E[Vh], and define the decision rule h* as optimal if E[Vh∗ ] = maxhE[Vh]. This specification is 
similar to the way in which a nested logit model is defined, with the new twist that the upper 
level of a two-level tree defines a choice set of heuristics. 
Consider a utility function  defined in terms of two attributes labelled x1 and x2 (in the empirical 
setting below these might be route-specific free flow time and congestion time, both in common 
units) and other attributes such as running cost and toll cost x3 and x4: 
 
( )1 2 3 4, , ,U f x x x x ε= +   (1) 
 
where  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 1 2
1 2 3 4 2
12 1 2 3 3 4 4 1 2
, , ,
x x x x if x x
f x x x x
x x x x if x x
β β β β α
β β β α
⎧ ⎫+ + + − >⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬+ + + − <⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 (2) 
 
β1, β2, β3, β4, β12, are estimated parameters. β12 does not necessarily equal a combination of β1 
and β2. We assume that the standard random utility alternative-specific error ε is not dependent 
on which form of ( )21, xxf is operative. The term ( )221 xx −  is introduced as the basis of a 
heuristic, and represents the ‘distance’ between x1 and x2. A squared form is computationally 
convenient, but another form could be used.  Intuitively, the heuristic associated with this 
functional specification is as follows (Layton and Hensher 2008): when the difference between 
the common metric attributes x1 and x2 is great enough, the agent’s process preserves attribute 
partitioning, and thus treats each attribute as separate entities, and evaluates their contribution to 
utility in the standard random utility model manner with parameters β1 and β2. On the other 
hand, when the difference between the common metric attributes x1 and x2 is relatively small, 
the agent’s process aggregates the attributes and thus treats the sum of x1 and x2 as a single 
attribute with utility weight β12.  
We can enrich the model by allowing the αi for person i to be randomly distributed (with αi > 0). 
A useful candidate distribution is that αi is exponential with mean 1/λ and 
density (Layton and Hensher 2008). This density generally has a large mass 
near zero, and so allows for some fraction of the population to behave essentially as standard 
optimisers. Still others behave as standard optimisers when attributes are dis-similar, but 
( ) αλλα −= ef
                                                          
6 Generalisation to more than two heuristics is feasible. 
7 The functional form selected is one of many possible forms, but is useful in illustrating the way in which the utility expression can 
be defined to test for specific heuristics applications across a sampled population. 
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aggregate when attributes are similar. Importantly, this density also allows for a tail of others 
who more frequently are aggregating the two attributes. The probability conditions are given in 
(3). In this model, we assume that there is an exponentially distributed threshold parameter, IID 
across alternatives and respondents, which indicates how the respondent views the attribute 
components.8  
( )( ) ( )221exp1221 xxxxP −−−=>− λα  (3a) 
and  
( )( ) ( 221exp221 xxxxP −−=<− λα )  (3b) 
Integrating over the αi we write U in conditional form (Layton and Hensher 2008): 
( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ]( )
( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ]( ) εαα
αα
+<−<−
+>−>−=
2
21
2
2121
2
21
2
2121
|,
|,
xxPxxxxf
xxPxxxxfU
 (4) 
Equation (4) implies that: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2 21 2 1 21 1 2 2 12 1 21 exp expx x x xU x x x xλ λβ β β− − − −= + − + + + ε  (5) 
Equation (5) together with the equivalent treatment of x3 and x4 implies that: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2 22 2 2 21 1 3 4 3 41 2 1 21 1 2 2 12 1 2 3 3 4 4 34 3 41 exp exp 1 exp expx x x xx x x xU x x x x x x x xλ λλ λβ β β β β β− − − −− − − −= + − + + + + − + + + ε
 (5a) 
Equation (5a) is a non-linear form in x1, x2, x3, x4. As λi, i=1,2, tends toward ∞ the distribution 
becomes degenerate at zero. In this case, all individuals are always standard optimisers who 
partition the common metric attributes and we obtain the linear additive form (6). 
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4U x x x xβ β β β= + + + + ε
                                                          
 (6) 
If λ tends toward 0, every individual becomes a common metric aggregator, as they perceive no 
difference between the two attributes9. Equation (5a) is the estimable utility expression for each 
alternative in a stated or revealed choice model.  
)
8 At much greater computational cost one might allow for the αi’s to be constant across alternatives for a given respondent. We 
leave refinements like this for future work. 
9 As an example, imagine an experimental design with x1 and x2 being dummy variables, and the only combinations considered 
are (1,0) and (0,1). In both cases ( = 1, and so we have condition: 221 xx −
( )( ) ( )( )1 1 2 2 12 1 21 exp expU x x x xλ λβ β β− −= + − + + + ε  
If x1 =1 and x2 = 0, we have condition (a), equivalent to (b). 
( )( ) ( )( )1 1 12 11 exp expU x xλ λβ β ε−= − + − +  (a) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1 12 1 1 1 12 1 1exp expU x x xλ λβ β β ε β β β ε−= + − + = + − +−  (b) 
The same functional expression applies for x2.  In both cases we have a co-mingling of parameters. If we include the combinations 
of (1,1) and (0,0), then we have equation (c). 
( ) εβ ++= 2112 xxU  (c) 
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The willingness to pay (WTP) function is nonlinear. The derivative of the utility expression 
with respect to a specific attribute is given in equation (7), using free flow time (defined as x1), 
and in equation (8) using slowed down time (x2) as examples of the common form. The exact 
same functional form for equations (7) and (8) applies to running cost and toll cost, respectively. 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2
12 12 1 2 1 2
/ 1 exp 2 exp
exp 2 exp
x x x x
x x x x
V x x x x x
x x x x
λ λ
λ λ
β β β λ
β β λ
− − − −
− − − −
∂ ∂ = − + + −
+ − + −
 (7) 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
12 12 1 2 1 2
/ 1 exp 2 exp
exp 2 exp
x x x x
x x x x
V x x x x x
x x x x
λ λ
λ λ
β β β λ
β β λ
− − − −
− − − −
∂ ∂ = − − + −
+ + + −
 (8) 
2.2 Process II: Common metric attribute parameter assignment 
We now introduce a new heuristic on top of this general non-linear specification, to account for 
parameter transfer. Essentially, we replace the aggregation of the two attributes with a 
parameter transfer rule. The attribute process model proposed assumes that if a common-metric 
attribute (i.e., time or cost components) is greater in magnitude to the other attribute, then 
individuals transfer the parameter assigned initially to the former attribute to the latter attribute. 
We call this process ‘attribute marginal disutility referencing’ (Hensher and Layton 2008).  
In this new model, the processing sets determined by α and the x’s are more complicated. First 
we note that for each pair of common metric attributes, say x1 and x2, there are three regimes, 
whether x1 > x2, x1 = x2, or x1 < x2. Next, in the language of our model, when x1 and x2 are 
cognitively close, neither attribute is expected to dominate, and hence the α conditions are 
reversed from the previous heuristic. Allowing α to follow an exponential distribution, as above, 
results in the following utilities for a situation in which there will be two sets of common metric 
attributes for two time measured attributes (xt1 and xt2 associated with λt), and two cost measured 
attributes (xc1 and xc2 associated with λc). We can write the overall utility in terms of the sub-
utilities for time, Vt, and cost, Vc. 
If xt1 > xt2:
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2 21 2 1 21 1 2 2 1 1 2exp 1 expt t t t t tx x x xt t t t t t t tV x x x xλ λβ β β− − − −= + + + −  (9) 
If xt1 < xt2:
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2 21 2 1 21 1 2 2 2 1 2exp 1 expt t t t t tx x x xt t t t t t t tV x x x xλ λβ β β− − − −= + + + −  (10) 
In the case of xt1 = xt2, evaluating either (9) or (10) at xt1 = xt2 yields: 
( )1 1 2 2t t t t tV x xβ β= +  (11) 
If xc1 > xc2:
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2 21 2 1 21 1 2 2 1 1 2exp 1 expc c c c c cx x x xc c c c c c c cV x x x xλ λβ β β− − − −= + + + − (12) 
If xc1 < xc2:
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2 21 2 1 21 1 2 2 2 1 2exp 1 expc c c c c cx x x xc c c c c c c cV x x x xλ λβ β β− − − −= + + + −  (13) 
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In the case of xc1 = xc2, evaluating either (12) or (13) at xc1 = xc2 yields: 
 
( )1 1 2 2c c c c cV x xβ β= +  (14) 
The overall utility for alternative k is given in equation (15). 
 
, cos ,k time k t kU V V kε= + +  (15) 
In any single utility expression setting, the rules will identify pairs of time and cost situations 
given above. There are three time conditions and three cost conditions, giving nine possible 
combinations for each alternative in a choice set. If λ tends toward ∞, every individual becomes 
a common metric re-packager using the parameter transfer rule for the marginal (dis)utility of 
each attribute. For all cases, as the common metric attributes become equal the standard 
compensatory model results. 
The willingness to pay expressions for Process II are summarised below. The exact same 
functional form for equations (16) and (17) applies to running cost and toll cost respectively. 
 
If xt1 > xt2: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )21211
2122111
212111
21221111
2
21
2
21
2
21
2
21
2
21
2
21
exp2
exp2
exp2exp1
exp2exp
ttt
xx
ttt
ttt
xx
ttttt
ttt
xx
ttt
xx
t
ttt
xx
tttt
xx
tt
t
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxxX
V
ttt
ttt
tttttt
tttttt
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−
=−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=∂
∂
−−
−−
−−−−
−−−−
λβ
λβββ
λββ
λβββ
λ
λ
λλ
λλ
  (16) 
If xt1 < xt2: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2
1 2 1 2
2
1 2
2
1 2
1 1 1 2 2
1
1 1 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 2 1 2
1 1 2 1 2
exp 2 exp
1 exp 2 exp
2 exp
2 exp
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t
t t t
x x x xt
t t t t t t
t
x x x x
t t t t t t t
x x
t t t t t t t t
x x
t t t t t t
V x x x xX
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
λ λ
λ λ
λ
λ
β β β λ
β β λ
β β β λ
β λ
− − − −
− − − −
− −
− −
∂ = − +∂
− − + − =
− + − −
+ −
1 2t t− +
2
 (17) 
 
If x1>x2: 
 
1 1 2/ ; /V x V xβ β∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ =  (18) 
 
6 
Attribute processing, heuristics, and preference construction in choice analysis 
Hensher 
 
2.3 Process III: Attribute non-attendance 
The general form above is not suitable for the attribute non-attendance heuristic, since it 
collapses down to a simple linear model. Given four attributes, the proposed utility for 
alternative k is given in equations (19) and (20).  
, , cos , cos ,k freeflowtime k sloweddowntime k toll t k runnung t k kU V V V V ε= + + + +  (19) 
 
or (suppressing the subscript k): 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 exp 1 exp 1 exp 1 expff ff sd sd rc rc toll tollx x xff ff sd sd rc rc toll tollU x x x xλ λ λ xλβ β β β− − − −= − + − + − + − ε+   (20) 
As λ tends toward 0, the probability of an attribute being non-attended increases; as λ tends 
toward ∞, the probability of full preservation increases. The WTP as the derivative of the utility 
expression with respect to a specific attribute is given in equation (21), using free flow time 
(defined as x1) as an example of the common form.  
( ) ( )/ exp eff ffxff ff ff ff ffV x xλ λβ β β λ− −∂ ∂ = − + xp x  (21) 
The focus above is a (potentially) behaviourally richer specification of the utility expression in a 
simple MNL model that embeds a number of process heuristics adopted by choice makers, 
which offers new opportunities to extract greater behavioural richness from simpler econometric 
specifications, in contrast to preserving the full attribute and parameter preservation assumption 
and introducing random parameters through mixed logit models. In time, we see the research 
evidence herein being extended to more advanced econometric specifications, but a reappraisal 
in the context of attribute processing under a simple MNL framework has merit in gaining a 
better understanding of the role of processing strategies in conditioning the parameters of 
specific attributes, and hence willingness to pay for such attributes. 
 
2.4 Process IV: Latent class specification: Non-attendance and dual processing of 
common-metric attributes in choice analysis 
The three classes of processing heuristics presented above can also be evaluated within a latent 
class model framework (see Hensher and Greene 2008)10. The underlying theory of the latent 
class model posits that individual behaviour depends on observable attributes and on latent 
heterogeneity that varies with factors that are unobserved by the analyst.  It is assumed that 
individuals are implicitly sorted into a set of Q processing classes, but which class contains any 
particular individual, whether known or not to that individual, is unknown to the analyst.  The 
behavioural model is a logit model for discrete choice among Ji alternatives, by individual i 
observed in Ti choice situations, given in (22). 
,
,1
exp( )
Prob[choice  by individual  in choice situation  | class ] = 
exp( )i
it j q
J
it j qj
j i t q
=
′
′∑
x
x
β
β
 (22) 
The number of observations and the size of the choice set may vary by individual.  In principle, 
the choice set could vary by choice situation as well.  For convenience, we allow yit to denote 
the specific choice made, so that the model provides: 
Pit | q(j)  =  Prob(yit = j | class = q). (23) 
                                                          
10 In 2007 Stephane Hess gave a presentation in Norway where he considered a latent class model to accommodate attribute 
non-attendance and aggregation (see Hess and Rose 2007). This was brought to my attention after completing the paper by 
Hensher and Greene (2008). Swait and Adamowicz (2001a) have also used latent class modelling to accommodate decision 
complexity. 
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For convenience, we also simplify this further to Pit | q.   For the given class assignment, the 
contribution of individual i to the likelihood is the joint probability of the sequence yi = 
[yi1,yi2,...yiT], given in (24). 
| |1
iT
i q it qt
P P==∏  (24) 
The class assignment is unknown.  Let Hiq denote the prior probability for class q for individual 
i. A convenient form is the multinomial logit (MNL) (equation 25). 
( )
( )1
exp
,
exp
i q
iq Q
i qq
H
=
′= ′∑
z
z
θ
θ  q = 1,...,Q, θQ = 0, (25) 
where zi denotes a set of observable characteristics which enter the model for class membership.  
To account for possible heuristics defined in the domains of attribute non-attendance, 
aggregation, and common-metric parameter transfer, we impose restrictions on parameters 
within each latent class, each class representing a particular process heuristic11. For example, to 
impose the condition of non-attendance of a specific attribute, we set its parameter to zero; to 
impose common-metric aggregation, we constrain two parameters to be equal; and to allow for 
parameter transfer, we define a single parameter based on the parameter associated with a 
specific attribute12.  
 
3. Empirical illustration 
To illustrate the implications of each attribute processing strategy, we use a data set drawn from 
a study undertaken in Sydney in 2004, in the context of car driving commuters making choices 
from a range of level of service packages defined in terms of travel times and costs, including a 
toll where applicable. The stated choice questionnaire presented respondents with sixteen choice 
situations, each giving a choice between their current (reference) route and two alternative 
routes with varying trip attributes. The sample of 243 effective interviews, each responding to 
16 choice sets, resulted in 3,888 observations for model estimation.  
To ensure that we captured a large number of travel circumstances and potential attribute 
processing rules, we sampled individuals who had recently undertaken trips of various travel 
times, in locations where tollroads currently exist.13 To ensure some variety in trip length, an 
individual was assigned to one of the three trip length segments based on a recent commuting 
trip: no more than 30 minutes, 31 to 60 minutes, and more than 61 minutes (capped at two 
hours). A telephone call was used to establish eligible participants from households stratified 
geographically, and a time and location agreed to for a face-to-face computer aided personal 
interview (CAPI).  
A statistically efficient design (see Rose and Bliemer 2007, Sandor and Wedel 2002) that is 
pivotted around the knowledge base of travellers, is used to establish the attribute packages in 
each choice scenario, in recognition of supporting theories in behavioural and cognitive 
psychology and economics, such as prospect theory. A pivot design recognises the useful 
information contained in a revealed preference alternative, capturing the accumulated exposure 
to the studied context. Further details of the design of the choice experiment and merits of pivot 
                                                          
11 Importantly, the number of classes selected is determined by the number of heuristics to investigate, and not by the usual BIC 
and AIC comparisons across a varying number of classes. 
12 Unlike process rule II, which is defined on the absolute levels of each attribute, the latent class model transfers the parameter to 
the entire sample within the class rule.  Hence the parameter transfer rule under process IV is strictly different to that under 
process rule II. 
13 Sydney has a growing number of operating tollroads; hence drivers have had a lot of exposure to paying tolls.  
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or referenced designs are provided in Hensher and Layton (2008), Hensher (2008a) and Rose et 
al. (2008). 
The two stated choice alternatives are unlabelled routes. The trip attributes associated with each 
route are free flow time, slowed down time, trip time variability, running cost and toll cost. All 
attributes of the stated choice (SC) alternatives are based on the values of the current trip. 
Variability in travel time for the current alternative was calculated as the difference between the 
longest and shortest trip time provided in non-SC questions. The SC alternative values for this 
attribute are variations around the total trip time. For all other attributes, the values for the SC 
alternatives are variations around the values for the current trip. The variations used for each 
attribute are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Profile of the attribute range in the SC design 
 
 Free-flow time Slowed down time Variability Running costs Toll costs 
Level 1 - 50% - 50% + 5% - 50% - 100% 
Level 2 - 20% - 20% + 10% - 20% + 20% 
Level 3 + 10% + 10% + 15% + 10% + 40% 
Level 4 + 40% + 40% + 20% + 40% + 60% 
 
The experimental design has one version of 16 choice sets (games). The design has no 
dominance.14 The distinction between free flow and slowed down time is designed to promote 
the differences in the quality of travel time between various routes – especially a tolled route 
and a non-tolled route, and is separate to the influence of total time. Free flow time is 
interpreted with reference to a trip at 3 am in the morning when there are no delays due to 
traffic.15 An example of a stated choice screen is shown as Figure 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1:  An example of a stated choice screen 
 
                                                          
14 The survey designs are available from the author on request. 
15 This distinction does not imply that there is a specific minute of a trip that is free flow per se, but it does tell respondents that 
there is a certain amount of the total time that is slowed down due to traffic etc., and hence a balance is not slowed down (i.e., is 
free flow like one observes typically at 3am in the morning).  
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4. Evidence on marginal willingness to pay: Value of travel 
time savings 
4.1 Evidence from processing models I-IV 
In this section, we bring together the evidence on value of travel time savings (VTTS) when one 
or more processing strategies are accounted for in modeling choice outcomes. The estimated 
models are not presented herein since they are given in Layton and Hensher (2008), Hensher 
and Layton (2008), Hensher and Rose (in press), and Hensher and Greene (2008). In all cases, 
we have accounted for the panel structure of the data. Our interest in this paper is on 
establishing the extent of under or over estimates of mean VTTS, in contrast to full relevancy 
and compensatory rules, when account is taken of the various process rules set out above. 
To obtain a VTTS distribution for each of free flow and slowed down time, we have to either 
simulate the distribution across values for the attribute(s) of interest, or apply the formula to a 
sample of observations. We chose the latter, using the same data used to estimate the models. 
Given that the denominator in the WTP expression is a weighted average of the role of running 
cost and toll cost, where the weights reflect the incidence of running and toll cost, and the 
numerator includes both attributes with a common metric, the WTP for a specific trip time 
component (i.e., free flow or slowed down time) is dependent on a mix of levels of all four 
attributes.  
We summarise the evidence in Table 2, including the reference source. The major finding is that 
all mean estimates of VTTS are higher when one or more processing rules are accounted for, in 
contrast to the traditional MNL model that assumes full attribute and parameter preservation.  
There is a clear trend here that, if reinforced by other data sets, sends a warning about the under-
estimation of VTTS when processing heuristics are not accounted for. The extent of under-
estimation appears significant; for the overall weighted average travel time it ranges from a high 
of 34.7 percent for the full set of process rules in the latent class model to a low of 7.3 percent 
for attribute aggregation for both time and cost16. 
 
Table 2:  Summary of willingness to pay estimates (2004$/person hour) 
 
Process Rule VTTS: 
Free flow time 
VTTS: 
Slowed down 
time 
VTTS: 
Weighted average 
time 
Reference 
Full preservation of attributes 
and parameters MNL 
11.76 15.72 14.07* Hensher and 
Greene (2008) 
Full preservation of attributes 
and parameters Mixed Logit 
14.11 16.78 15.67* Hensher and 
Greene (2008) 
Process I: Attribute 
aggregation 
12.87 16.78 15.10 Layton and 
Hensher (2008)17
Process II: Parameter transfer  13.37 19.44 16.91 Hensher and 
Layton (2008) 
Process III: Attribute non-
attendance 
15.28 (1.91) 22.05 (2.74) 19.23 Hensher and Rose 
(in press) 
                                                          
16 It is worth noting that the attribute aggregation model (Process I) allowed for aggregation of both the time and the cost 
components. By contrast, the latent class model (Process IV) only found time aggregation statistically significant, but did identify a 
significant effect from the heuristic that transferred the toll cost parameter to the running cost attribute.  What this latter evidence 
suggests is that individuals do not tend to add up the cost components, but tend to re-weight their influence by the parameter 
transfer rule. 
17 In order to estimate the model as a panel, Layton and Hensher (2008) used a combination of many start values and simulated 
annealing (code written by Tsionas 9/4/95, available at the American university Gauss Archive: 
http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/cas/econ/gaussres/GAUSSIDX.HTM). Using the maximum from the simulated 
annealing approach, we then computed a Newton-Raphson iteration using 500 replications of the simulator, and computed the 
covariance from all terms except for λt and λc. 
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Process IV: Latent class 
mixture of all rules 
- - 19.62* Hensher and 
Greene (2008) 
 
Notes: * The standard errors have been obtained by bootstrapping. The mean standard deviations for MNL, Mixed 
Logit and Latent Class are respectively $1.42, $3.71 and $5.10. We can reject the null of no difference between LC 
and MNL and between LC and mixed logit but not between MNL and mixed logit. 
 
We take a closer look at the findings from the latent class model, summarised in Table 3. There 
is a range of mean estimates of the value of travel time savings across the latent classes. The 
range is $1.35 to $42.19, after dividing the marginal disutility of each time component by the 
weighted average cost parameter, where the weights are the levels of running and toll cost. To 
obtain an overall sample average, we have to weight each mean estimate by the probability of 
class membership.  
The overall sample weighted average for total time is $19.62, which contrasts with $14.07 for 
the traditional MNL specification in Table 1 (Hensher and Greene 2008, Table 3). The mean 
estimate of VTTS is 39.4 percent higher when process heterogeneity is accounted for across 
three classes of heuristics. A closer look at the contribution of each heuristic suggests that 
attribute addition for the two time components produces the highest mean estimate contribution 
to VTTS, after controlling for class membership.  Ignoring free flow time is the next 
contributor, followed by full attendance to all attributes. Ignoring running cost and slowed down 
time is the next contribution.   
 
Table 3:  Values of travel time savings from a latent class model (2004$ per person hour) 
 
NAT = not attended to 
ParT = parameter transfer 
Class 
membership 
probability 
Free flow 
time  
Slowed down 
time  
Total time 
All attributes attended to 0.2817 5.87 9.89 8.22 
Free flow NAT 0.1119  23.02 23.02 
Toll cost  NAT 0.0359 3.95 8.93 6.85 
Slowed down time  NAT 0.0643 1.35  1.35 
Running cost and slowed down 
time NAT 
0.0497 42.19  42.19 
Free flow and slowed down time 
added 
0.2978 37.57 37.57 
Free flow to slowed down and 
vice versa ParT 
0.0758 4.57 4.57 
Free flow to slowed down ParT 
and running cost to toll cost and 
vice versa ParT 
0.0829 9.26 9.26 
Class membership weighted 
VTTS 
  19.62 (5.10) 
 
Source: Hensher and Greene (2008). Note: standard error for each component VTTS are available on 
request. 
4.2 Evidence from self-stated processing response for common-metric addition 
The focus of the previous sections was on exploring a way in which we are able to allow for the 
possibility of heterogeneity in the way that individuals process common-metric attributes in 
making choices, focusing on a number of potential heuristics, without having to ask 
supplementary (deterministic) elicitation questions.  In addition to the stated choice experiment, 
in the survey we did however ask supplementary elicitation questions shown in Figure 218. In 
                                                          
18 This question was asked after completion of all 16 choice tasks. An alternative approach is to ask these questions after each 
choice task as was the case in Puckett and Hensher (2008, 2009), and Scarpa, Thiene and Hensher (2008). Our preference is for 
choice-task-specific self-stated processing questions, especially where attribute level matters; however this comes at the risk of 
cognitive burden and the possibility that the number of choice tasks might have to be reduced. We also recognise the potential 
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this section we investigate the possible implications of conditioning the preference function use 
to derive WTP estimates, using the response to question 2 to illustrate the empirical 
implications. A large percentage of the respondents stated, in supplementary questions (see 
Hensher 2008), that they added the components: 88.06 percent and 76.5 percent respectively for 
time and cost.   
 
 
Figure 2:  CAPI questions on attribute relevance 
 
We estimated five panel-specification models - two mixed logit (with and without error 
components), and three latent class models.  One mixed logit model ignored the attribute 
processing rule, and the other accommodated it through the specification of separate parameters 
to capture the following conditions: (i) added up times but not costs, (ii) added up costs but not 
times, (iii) added up both times and costs, and (iv) preserved all four attributes as separate 
components. One latent class model defined four class memberships as per (i)-(iv) above 
without recourse to information from the supplementary questions, whereas another latent class 
model conditioned class membership on conditions (i)-(iv). A base latent class model assumed 
all attributes are treated separately, but three classes were identified with statistically significant 
latent class probabilities. The findings are summarised in Table 4. Mixed logit and latent class 
models are well documented in the literature.  
 
Table 4:  Influence of self-stated attribute processing strategy (APS) on VTTS 
(i) Mixed Logit Models (panel specification) 
 
Attributes Mixed Logit model  (constrained triangular for random parameters), t-ratios in 
brackets except for VTTS, which is the standard deviation 
 
 No allowance for self-stated APS Allowance for self-stated APS 
Random parameters:   
Free flow time (FF) -0.10023 (-17.33) -0.0497 (-3.64) 
Slowed down time (SDT) -0.1147 (-21.94) -0.687 (-5.98) 
Aggregated FF and SDT - -0.1236 (-22.5) 
Running cost (RC) -0.4167 (-14.58) -0.1945 (-4.11) 
Toll cost (TC) -0.188 (-22.99) -0.2905 (-9.70) 
Aggregated RC and TC - -0.6103 (-21.62) 
Fixed parameter:   
                                                                                                                                                                          
limitation of such questions, and devote a later section to future ways of investigating question structure, and the 
believability/plausibility of the evidence. 
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Non-reference alternative dummy -0.1344 (-2.88) -0.1669 (-3.61) 
Log-likelihood at convergence -2762.80 -2711.88 
Log-likelihood at zero 4271.41 
Weighted average VTTS ($Aus2004 
per person hour) 
$15.87 ($10.14) $20.12 ($16.01) 
 
(ii) Mixed Logit Models (panel specification) with Error Component 
Attributes Mixed Logit model  (constrained triangular for random parameters), t-ratios in brackets 
except for VTTS which is standard deviation 
 
 No allowance for self-stated APS Allowance for self-stated APS 
Random parameters:   
Free flow time (FF) -0.11190 (-31.45) -0.08113 (-5.50) 
Slowed down time (SDT) -0.12746 (-34.25) -0.07514(-7.06) 
Aggregated FF and SDT - -0.13076 (-19.37) 
Running cost (RC) -0.49740 (-19.74) -0.23583(-3.96) 
Toll cost (TC) -0.55193(-32.95) -0.26234(-7.489) 
Aggregated RC and TC - -0.65814(-17.19) 
Fixed parameter:   
Non-reference alternative dummy 0.18195 (1.95) -0.27233 (-2.13) 
Standard deviation of latent random 
effect 
2.43423 (24.5) 2.3357 (28.21) 
Log-likelihood at convergence -2485.03 -2447.43 
Log-likelihood at zero 4271.41 
Weighted average VTTS ($Aus2004 per 
person hour) 
$16.11($10.87) $22.63 ($23.26) 
 
(iii) Latent Class Models (panel specification) 
 
Base Model: 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class3 
Free flow time -0.04006 (-4.7) -0.2022 (-28.9) -0.0338 (-7.5) 
Slowed down time -0.0603 (-9.6) -0.2009 (-31.6) -0.0749 (-22.0) 
Running cost -0.3323 (-8.9) -0.3399 (-10.7) -0.4739 (-15.3) 
Toll cost -0.2883 (-10.7) -0.3417 (-24.2) -0.6115 (-33.6) 
Non-reference alternative 2.5043 (12.3) 0.3947 (-7.2) -1.0281 (-23.3) 
Class membership probability 0.263 (6.92) 0.361 (10.45) 0.376 (11.14) 
Log-likelihood at convergence -2542.74 
Log-likelihood at zero -4271.41 
Weighted average VTTS ($Aus2004 per person hour) $17.89 
 
Models Allowing for Attribute Processing: 
 
 No allowance for self-stated APS Allowance for self-stated APS 
 
Latent  Class 
attributes: 
Class 
membership 
probability 
Parameter estimates for 
FF,SDT,RC,TC, NONSQ 
(t-ratios in brackets) 
Class 
membership 
probability 
Parameter estimates for 
FF,SDT,RC,TC,NONSQ 
(t-ratios in brackets) 
All attributes treated 
separately 
0.379 -.049,-.090,-.638,-.743, -.622 
(-5.5,-13.0,-11.3,-19.1,-6.9) 
0.381 -.055,-.092,-.648, -.748,-.637 (-5.0,-
12.1,-10.1,-16.3,-6.7) 
Time components 
aggregated 
0.050 -.057,-.057,-0.29,-0.38,-3.9 (-
3.3,-3.3,-1.9,-9.2,-11.1) 
0.052 -.054,-.054,-.332, -.370,-3.82 (-3.2,-
3.2,-2.0,-8.4,-10.4) 
Cost components 
aggregated 
0.318 -.217,-.212,-.319,-.319,-.428 
(-26.9,-29.2,-19.1,-19.1,-6.8) 
0.310 -.221,-.215,-.317,-.317,-.410 (-25.1,-
27.8,-17.5,-17.5,-6.3) 
Time and Cost 
components  
aggregated 
0.253 -.052 ,-.052,-.282,-.282,2.58 
(-17.4,-17.4,-25.4,-25.4,22.2) 
0.257 -.050,-.050,-.277,-.277,2.49 (-16.1,-
16.1,-23.2,-23.2,21.9) 
Theta in Class 
Probability: 
   
  Constant, FF,SDT,FFSDT,RC,TC,RCTC 
Note: all covariates are in minutes or dollars, except 
the constant. Statistically significant: *= 5% , **= 10 
% level 
All attributes treated 
separately 
 1.35**,-.006,.003,-.005,-.33,-.079,-.093 (2.4,-.17,.14,-
.61,-1.1,-.45,-1.4) 
Time components 
aggregated 
 -1.59,.18*,-.45,.009,.52,-.61,-.13 (-1.2,1.9,-1.4,.44,1.6,-
1.1,-.7) 
Cost components 
aggregated 
 1.16*,-.02,-.03,-.009,.35*,-.15,-.13* (1.9,-.7,-1.1,-
.9,1.7,-.9,-1.7) 
Log-likelihood at 
convergence 
-2427.57 -2399.64 
Log-likelihood at zero -4271.41 
Weighted average 
VTTS ($Aus2004 per 
person hour) 
$18.02 ($15.02) $18.05 ($15.28) 
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For mixed logit, we have selected a quasi-constrained triangular distribution for each random 
parameter, in which the spread19 estimate is constrained to equal the mean estimate for the 
random parameters. If the scale equals 1.0, the range is 0 to 2 ß1. This is an appealing way of 
capturing the random taste heterogeneity, avoiding the search for such heterogeneity at the 
extremes of unconstrained distributions20. The triangular distribution was first used for random 
coefficients by Train and Revelt (2000) later incorporated into Train (2003), and it is 
increasingly being used in empirical studies.  
The overall goodness-of-fit for the models, with allowance for self-stated APS, are statistically 
better than when self-stated APS is not accounted for. The mixed logit models differ in the way 
that the time and cost attributes are included in the utility expressions, but in both models all 
parameters have the expected negative signs, and are statistically significant at the one percent 
level. Given the different ways that free flow and slowed down time are handled, the most 
sensible representation of the value of travel time savings is as a weighted average estimate, 
with weights associated with the contribution of each of the three specifications of cost and of 
time. The VTTS in Table 4 are based on conditional distributions (that is, conditional on the 
alternative chosen). The VTTS in the mixed logit model is significantly higher when the self-
stated APS is accounted for, i.e., $20.12 (22.63 with error components) per person hour, 
compared to $15.87 ($16.11 with error components) per person hour. 
The latent class model is based on four attribute addition rules (i)-(iv), and all time and cost 
parameters are statistically significant at the one percent level, and of the expected sign when 
class membership is conditioned on the self-stated APS; however when the self-stated APS are 
not included, all but one parameter is statistically significant at the one percent level, the 
exception being running cost in the second class, which has a 10 percent significance level. The 
overall log-likelihood at convergence is greatly improved over the mixed logit model for both 
latent class models, suggesting that the discrete nature of heterogeneity captured through latent 
class is a statistical improvement over the continuous representation of heterogeneity in the 
mixed logit model. The weighted average VTTS are derived first across classes for each 
attribute, based on conditional distributions associated with the probability of class membership 
of each respondent within each class, and then a further weighting is undertaken using weights 
that reflect the magnitudes of the components of time and cost. 
The weighted average VTTS in the two latent class models that account for attribute processing 
are virtually identical. What this suggests is that once we have captured the alternative 
processing rules, though the definition of latent classes, the inclusion of the self-stated APS 
rules as conditions on class membership do not contribute additional statistically useful 
evidence to revise the findings, in the aggregate. This is consistent with the statistical non-
significance of most of the self-stated APS variables; with only three parameters having a 10 
percent significance level (excluding the constants). There were no parameters with one or five 
percent significance levels. However, when we contrast this evidence to the base latent class 
model which makes no allowance for attribute processing, the mean VTTS is only slightly 
lower (i.e., $17.89 per person hour compared to $18.02, and $14.07 for the MNL model). What 
this may suggest is that the latent class specification may have done a good job is approximating 
the way in which attributes are processed.  
These findings support the hypothesis that allowance for attribute processing rules tends to 
result, on average, in a higher mean estimate of WTP for travel time savings. This is consistent, 
directionally, with other studies undertaken by Rose et al. (2005) and Hensher and Layton 
(2008). 
 
                                                          
19 The spread is the standard deviation times 6 . 
20 We acknowledge that this restriction is controversial; although we prefer to adopt it in contrast to unconstrained distributions 
where sign changes are common, or eliminating all negative VTTS as some analysts do. 
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5. Other perspectives - belief and support functions to 
establish judgment of evidence strength 
A growing number of studies ask supplementary questions, such as those illustrated in the 
previous section, to elicit how respondents processed specific attributes (see e.g., Hensher 2008, 
Hess and Hensher 2008). The reliability of responses to such questions (e.g., ‘which attributes 
did you ignore?’ or ‘which attributes did you add up?’) is not without controversy (see Bertrand 
and Mullainathan 2001), with preliminary evidence suggesting that the marginal WTP, when the 
responses to supplementary intention questions are used to condition the treatment of an 
attribute in model estimation, are sometimes higher and sometimes lower than when processing 
is excluded. In contrast, the (limited but growing) evidence appears to be consistently in the 
upward direction when heuristics are tested through the functional specification of non-linear 
utility expressions. So which tendency is ‘correct’? The answer is far from clear. Furthermore, 
some studies have shown that the expectation of a parameter approaching zero, when a 
respondent claims that they ignored an attribute, is not proven (Hess and Hensher 2008); in 
contrast a recent study by Rose et al. (2008a) using Bayesian methods, found encouraging 
evidence that self-stated responses on attribute non-preservation were indeed consistent with a 
statistically non-significant difference around a zero parameter estimate. 
One potentially fruitful way forward is to transform the self-stated processing responses to 
recognise the potential for error in response21. While there are a number of ways that this might 
be undertaken, one way that is worthy of investigation is known as the belief-function 
perspective. There is a large literature on believability, emanating from the works of Dempster 
and Shafer in the 1960s and 1970s (Shafer 1976, Dubois and Prade 1988). Although not focused 
on attribute processing in choice analysis per se, the sentiment is aligned22.  
The focus is on the uncertainty that arises because of the lack of knowledge of the true state of 
nature, where we not only lack the knowledge of a stable frequency (how can we be sure that 
the heuristic adopted is stable over time? (see also Yoon and Simonson 2008), as implied by the 
process heuristics in previous sections), but also we lack the means to specify fully the fixed 
conditions under which repetitions can be performed (Shafer and Srivastava 1990). The 
Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions is used to assess reliability of evidence, which 
provides support for the presence or absence of such a variable in situations where the event 
cannot be treated as a random variable. Dempster (1967) introduces belief functions from a 
statistical perspective in terms of carrying a (frequentist) probability measure from a ‘space of 
observations’ to a ‘space of interpretations of these observations’ by a ‘point-to-set mapping’ 
(Dubois and Prade 1988).  
Many individuals are influenced by the views of others, suggesting that additional information 
on the believability of an individual’s response may be aided by this extra evidence23. Thus we 
need to find ways in which we can triangulate evidence from various sources, in order to 
establish a measure of belief of the evidence offered by an individual on how they processed 
specific attributes. The level of belief, on whether the person in question processed an attribute 
using a specific rule, or not, depends on the items of evidence, and their credibility. A belief 
function treatment of such problems provides a possible framework. It involves three constructs 
- belief functions (BF), plausibility functions (PF), and a measure of ambiguity. When 
combined, especially BF and PF, we obtain Dempster’s rule of what I term ‘rule reliability’.  
                                                          
21 Another interesting approach is to recognise the role of heterogeneity and to identify what are the strongest parametric 
assumptions and see how they can be relaxed through modelling heterogeneity. King and Wand (2007) offer some interesting 
ideas in the context of ordered choices and anchoring Vignettes identified from supplementary information designed to account for 
differences in perceptions across respondents. See Greene and Hensher (2009, chapter 7).
22 A linked literature in social psychology is focused on the meaning and moderators of attitude strength, where strong attitudes 
are characterized by high levels of confidence and stability. Attitude confidence is defined as the degree to which an individual is 
certain that his attitude is correct. See Krosnick and Schuman (1988). 
23 Extra evidence may be obtained from other questions asked to the same individual, as well as questions to other persons. 
15 
Attribute processing, heuristics, and preference construction in choice analysis 
Hensher 
 
We now explain this rule in more detail, and suggest the nature of data required in future studies 
to embed the rule-reliability measure into the estimation of choice models. 
The Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions is similar to probability theory, however, with 
one difference. Under probability theory, uncertainty is assigned to the state of nature based on 
the knowledge of frequency of occurrence. However, under belief functions, uncertainty is 
assigned to the state of nature or assertion of interest in an indirect way, based on the 
probability knowledge in another frame, by mapping that knowledge onto the frame of interest. 
This mapping may not necessarily be one-to-one. To illustrate, suppose we have a variable, say 
A, with n possible mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of values: a1, a2, a3,  . . . , an. These 
values could be alternative ways that an attribute is processed (in isolation of in conjunction 
with other attributes), and/or processing responses to different question structures, including a 
simple binary statement of ‘ignored or did not ignore’24 the attribute, or ‘added up or did not 
add up two attributes of a common metric’. Define the frame, Θ = {a1, a2, a3,  . . . , an} of 
discernment25 for the variable A. Under probability theory, for such a set, we assign a 
probability mass, P(ai), to each state ai such that the sum of all these probabilities equals one, 
i.e., . However, under the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions, 
uncertainties are assigned in terms of belief masses to not only singletons, but also to all the 
sub-sets of the frame, and to the entire frame Θ. These belief masses add to one, similar to 
probability masses. 
n
i
i=1
P(a ) = 1∑
The entire frame Θ in our example might be a binary setting of ‘ignored’ (a1) and ‘not ignored’ 
(a2) for a specific attribute associated with an alternative and/or a choice task26.  These belief 
masses define a function called the basic belief mass function (Shafer, 1976). We can write a 
belief mass assigned to a subset B as m(B), where B could be a single element, or a subset of 
two, a sub-set of three (e.g., degrees of attribute preservation), and so on, or the entire frame, Θ. 
The sum of such belief masses equals one, i.e., . When the non-zero belief masses 
are only defined on the singletons, the belief function reduces to probability theory. Thus, one 
can argue that probability theory is a special case of Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. 
B
m(B) = 1
⊆Θ
∑
To crystallise this distinction in an example, suppose we were able to determine, from a number 
of sources, that m(IG) =0.3, m(NIG)=0, and m(IG,NIG)=0.727. IG stands for ‘the ignore 
response being a reasonable representation of reality’, and NIG stands for ‘the ignored response 
being either materially misstated or not reflecting acceptable views of others’.28 The belief 
function interpretation of these belief masses is that the analyst has 0.3 level of support for 'IG', 
no support for 'NIG, and 0.7 level of support remains uncommitted which represents 
ignorance29 (Dubois and Prade 1988)30. However, if we had to express the above judgment in 
                                                          
24 Including different wording, such as ‘attending to or not attending to’. 
25 That is the quality of being able to grasp and comprehend what is obscure.
26 It could also be degrees of attribute relevance (a1, a2,…, an), from totally relevant (not ignored) to totally irrelevant (ignored). 
27 Establishing these probabilities is the great challenge. 
28 Information to gauge the reliability of stated self-intentions could be sought from the very same person along similar lines to 
supplementary questions used in reducing the hypothetical bias (HB) gap in willingness to pay. An example in the HB context is a 
supplementary certainty scale question after each choice scenario, along lines suggested by Johannesson et al. (1999), on a 
scale 0 (very unsure) to 10 (very sure), to indicate how sure or certain the respondent is that they would actually chose that route 
(or not at all) at the indicated price and travel time. 
29 A “complete ignorance heuristic” (CI) reflects the case in which the individual is not aware of the influence of the attributes in 
their utility function. Arana et al. (2008, 757) suggest an interpretation as follows: “It collects individuals who do not care about the 
consequences of their responses, or who do not pay attention to the experiment. In other words, CI is utilized by those individuals 
who make choices using a completely random process.” 
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terms of probabilities, we get into problems, because we will assign P(IG) = 0.3 and P(NIG) = 
0.7, which implies that there is a 70 percent chance that the response to the question is 
‘materially misstated or does not reflect acceptable views of others’. However this is not what 
the analyst’s judgment is; he has no information or evidence that ignoring an attribute is 
materially misstated.  Simply knowing the fact that the response appears to be reasonable, 
compared to the predicted values based on the average views of others, including additional 
information obtained from the specific individual, provide no evidence that the response to the 
question on whether an attribute is ignored is materially misstated. It only provides some level of 
support that the subjective response is accurately stated. 
The Belief Function is defined as follows: The belief in B, Bel(B), for a subset B of elements of 
a frame, Θ, represents the total belief in B, and is equal to the belief mass, m(B), assigned to B 
plus the sum of all the belief masses assigned to the set of elements (C) that are contained in B.  
In terms of symbols: Bel(B) = .
C B
m(C)
⊆∑
31
The Plausibility Function is defined as follows: Intuitively, the plausibility of B is the degree to 
which B is plausible given the evidence.  In other words, Pl(B) represents the maximum belief 
that could be assigned to B, given that all the evidence collected in the future support B. In 
mathematical terms, one can define plausibility of B as 
B C=
Pl(B) = m(C)
∩ ∅
∑ , which can also be 
expressed as: Pl(B) = 1 - Bel(~B), which is the degree to which we do not assign belief to its 
negation (~B).  The belief-function measure of ambiguity in an assertion, say B, is the 
difference between the plausibility of B, and the belief in B (Wong and Wang 1993).  
Dempster’s rule (Shafer 1976) combines more than one independent items of evidence, similar 
to Bayes’ rule in probability theory. Dempster’s rule reduces to Bayes’ rule under the condition 
when all the belief masses defined on the frame are zero, except the ones for the singletons. For 
example, for two independent items of evidence32 pertaining to a frame of discernment, Θ, we 
can write the combined belief mass for a sub-set B in Θ using Dempster’s rule of combination 
as: 
 1 2
C1 C2 = B
m(B) = m (C1)m (C2)/K
∩
∑ , (26) 
where 
 
C1 C2 = 
1 2K = 1  m (C1)m (C2) 
∩ ∅
− ∑  (27) 
The symbols m1(C1) and m2(C2) determine the belief masses of C1 and C2, respectively, from 
the two independent items of evidence represented by the subscripts. K is a re-normalisation 
constant. The second term in K represents the conflict between the two items of evidence33; the 
two items of evidence are not combinable if the conflict term is 1.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
30 Dubois and Prade (1988, 55) state “Probability theory is not very good at modeling weak states of knowledge where the 
uncertainty about some event is but loosely related to the uncertainty about the contrary event. Especially, total ignorance … 
cannot be expressed by a single probability measure. Another way of putting it is that probability cannot distinguish between the 
absence of belief in not-A and the belief in A”. 
31 By definition, the belief mass assigned to an empty set is always zero, i.e., m(∅ ) = 0. 
32 Such as the supplementary self-stated intention questions and the reliability question (see footnote 28). 
33 A challenging problem in combining uncertain information is to decide what to do with conflicts. Generally, combining 
information issued from conflicting sources leads to un-normalized uncertainty measures. Shafer (1976), in advocating Dempster’s 
rule, suggests that the resulting uncertainty measure should be re-normalised. He motivates his choice by the Sherlock Holmes 
principle saying that ‘having discarded the impossible, what remains, however improbable, is the truth’. But this principle assumes 
that sources of information are both totally reliable, an over-optimistic assumption in some situations. The weight m( ), and more 
generally, the amount of sub-normalisation, assesses the extent to which both sources are indeed reliable. Moreover, the 
∅
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Let us consider an example to illustrate the details of Dempster’s rule. Suppose we have the 
following sets of belief masses obtained from two independent items of evidence34 related to the 
accurate representation of whether an attribute is ignored (IG) or not ignored (NIG): 
Evidence 1: m
1
(IG) = 0.3, m
1
(NIG) = 0.0, m
1
({IG, NIG}) = 0.7, 
Evidence 2: m
2
(IG) = 0.6, m
2
(NIG) = 0.1, m
2
({IG, NIG }) = 0.3. 
The re-normalisation constant for the above case is: 
K = 1 – [m
1
(IG)m
2
(NIG) + m
1
(NIG)m
2
(IG)] = 1 – [0.3*0.1 + 0.0*0.6] = 0.97. 
Using Dempster’s rule (26), the combined belief masses for ‘IG’, ‘NIG’, and {IG, NIG} are 
given by35: 
m(IG) = [m
1
(IG)m
2
(IG) + m
1
(IG)m
2
({IG, NIG }) + m
1
({IG, NIG })m
2
(IG)]/K 
        =  [0.3*0.6 + 0.3*0.3 + 0.7*0.6]/0.97 = 0.69/0.97 = 0.711, 
m(NIG)=[m
1
(NIG)m
2
(NIG)+m
1
(NIG)m
2
({IG,NIG})+m
1
({IG,NIG })m
2
(NIG)]/K  
        = [0.0*0.1 + 0.0*0.3 + 0.7*0.1]/0.97 = 0.07/0.97 = 0.0721, 
m({IG, NIG }) = m
1
({IG, NIG })m
2
({IG, NIG })/K = 0.7*0.3/0.97 = 0.21/0.97  
 = 0.2165. (28) 
The combined beliefs and plausibilities that attribute processing is not misstated are: 
Bel(IG) = m(IG) = 0.711, and Bel(NIG) = m(NIG) = 0.0721, (29) 
Pl(IG) = 1 – Bel(NIG) = 0.928, and Pl(NIG) = 1 – Bel(IG) = 0.289. (30) 
 
The choice model, for each individual observation, can have each attribute discounted by the 
‘plausibility factors’: Pl(IG) (=0.928) and Pl(NIG) (=0.289). This might be a decomposition of a 
random parameter in a mixed logit model, or interaction terms in MNL and latent class models, 
or through conditioning the scale parameters. These plausibility factors would be applied to all 
observations, based on evidence obtained from supplementary questions. The challenge for 
ongoing research is to identify a relevant set of questions posed to the respondent and other 
agents that can be used to quantify evidence, suitable for deriving the belief and plausibility 
functions for each respondent. 
The Dempster-Shafer theory of belief has links to support theory (Tversky and Koehler 1994, 
Fox and Tversky 1998, Idson et al. 2001, Hensher 2009), a psychological model of degree of 
belief, which argues that different descriptions of the same event often give rise to 
systematically different responses, and hence the judged probability of the union of disjoint 
events is generally smaller than the sum of judged probabilities of these events. Support theory 
assumes that subjective probability is attached to descriptions of events (e.g., ‘which attribute(s) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
normalisation operation introduces discontinuities in the combination rule. See Dubois and Prade (1987) for a discussion of 
combination rules for belief functions and possibility measures, including the case of unequally reliable sources. 
34 It is straightforward to generalise to any number of evidence sources. 
35 The term “m2({IG, NIG})m1({IG, NIG)}” represents the “unknown” or ambiguity factor. This is assigned to m({IG, NIG}). 
Dempster’s rule for combining two items of evidence on a frame {x, ~x} of a binary variable X dictates that the combined belief 
masses on the frame should be determined as follows: m(x) = [m1(x)m2(x) + m1(x)m2({x, ~x}) + m1({x, ~x})m2(x)]/K where K = 1 – 
[m1 (x)m2 (~x) + m1 (~x)m2 (x)]. The above equation comes from the simple logic that state ‘x’ is true if both items of evidence 
suggest that ‘x’ is true, i.e., m1 (x)m2(x), or one item of evidence suggests that ‘x’ is true but the other one is not sure whether it is 
‘x’ or ‘~x’, i.e., m1 (x)m2 ({x, ~x}) and m1 ({x, ~x})m2 (x). K is a re-normalization constant to make sure that the combined m-values 
add to one. As you can see above, the second term in K, i.e., [m1 (x)m2(~x) + m1 (~x)m2(x)], represents conflict between the two 
items of evidence; one item of evidence is suggesting that ‘x’ is true and the other one is suggesting that ‘~x’ is true. m(~x) =  [m1 
(~x)m2 (~x) + m1(~x)m2 ({x, ~x}) + m1({x, ~x})m2 (~x)]/K. The above equation again comes from the logic that state ‘~x’ is true if 
both items of evidence suggest that ‘~x’ is true, i.e., m1 (~x)m2 (~x), or one item of evidence suggests that ‘~x’ is true but other one 
is not sure whether it is ‘x’ or ‘~x’, i.e., m1(~x)m2({x, ~x}) and m1 ({x, ~x})m2(~x). m({x, ~x}) = [m1 ({x, ~x})m2 (x, ~x})]/K. The above 
equation suggests that if both items of evidence are not sure whether it is ‘x’ or ‘~x’, then the combined evidence also is not sure 
whether it is ‘x’ or ‘~x’. Thus, [m11({x, ~x})m2 (x, ~x})] maps to m({x, ~x}). We thank Stewart Jones for this clarification. 
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did you ignore?’ or ‘did you ignore attribute x?’), and not events per se, and hence different 
descriptions of the same event may be assigned different probabilities. 
There is a key distinction, however, between the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief and support 
theory, linked to the extensionality principle, which states that events with the same extension 
are assigned the same probability. The extensionality principle is problematic in that alternative 
descriptions of the same event can produce systematically different judgments. For example, in 
the context of two states of the world, called events, such as ‘two attributes were added up’ and 
‘two attributes were treated separately through unpacking retention’, we might ask an individual 
to consider two routes to take for a given trip. In the first experiment we might offer total times 
of 30 and 40 minutes (and associated costs of $4 and $2.50); in the second experiment we might 
offer a free flow time of 20 minutes and a congested time of 10 minutes versus 25 minutes for 
free flow and 15 minutes for congested time, keeping costs the same as the first experiment. The 
responses are almost always different across a sample (see Layton and Hensher 2008), since 
some individuals will initially add up the travel time components and undertake the comparison, 
essentially equivalencing experiments 1 and 2; whereas other individuals will evaluate the 
unpacked time components and make a judgment (i.e., the choice) which implicitly has 
weighted the components differently to the weight obtained for the aggregation of time. 
The previous paragraph is essentially re-iterating a point made by Krantz (1991) that Dempster-
Shafer’s model is more suitable for judgments of evidence strength than for judgments of 
probability, the latter being what we focus on in the estimation of the choice model to explain 
the choice amongst alternatives, in contrast to how we enter a specific attribute into the choice 
model. The judgments of evidence strength is the very role that the plausibility function plays in 
the context of specifying the way that a specific attribute is processed in the context of stated 
choice experiments. We are not using the belief (or indeed the support) theory to establish 
probabilities of outcomes, since that is accommodated though the choice model. The specific 
feature of the belief paradigm is the idea of superadditivity; namely that multiple sources of 
evidence (obtained through more detail, or what is commonly referred to as unpacking in the 
psychology literature) results in a belief in the disjunction of disjoint events being greater than 
or equal to the sum of the beliefs in each of the components. For example, if we have four 
attributes (x1,x2,x3,x4), of which the first two have  a common metric (e.g., travel time) and the 
last two have a common metric (e.g., cost), we might have  a number of ways in which we can 
structure questions suitable for establishing how each specific attribute is processed (in the 
context of how the package of attributes is processed).  
There are a number of possible ways of evaluating an attribute in arriving at a decision on how 
it will be processed in the context of a choice task. These might, for example, be based on five 
items of evidence (or heuristics) in relation to the processing of x1 (the responses could include: 
(i) ignored or not, (ii) added up with another common-metric attributes, and (iii) transferred the 
parameter to another common-metric attribute):  
E_α = E(x1): ‘I evaluated only x1 in deciding what role x1 plays’36  
E_β = E(x1,x2); E(x1,x3); E(x1,x4);…; E(E(x1,x2,x3,x4): ‘I evaluated x1 in the context of a subset of 
the attributes offered’  
E_γ = E(x1,x2): ‘I evaluated x1 in the context of attributes that have a common metric with x1’ 
E_ε = E(x1+x2, x3+x4): ‘I evaluated x1 by adding up attributes that have a common metric (e.g., 
times and costs)’ 
E_η = E(x1,x2,x3,x4): ‘I evaluated every attribute in deciding what role x1 plays.’ 
 
For each of these candidate heuristics, the analysts might ask, in the context of whether an 
attribute x1 was ignored or not: ‘Please allocate 100 points between the three possible ways you 
                                                          
36 The approach commonly adopted in supplementary questions. The precise wording would vary according to the nature of the 
empirical study. 
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might (or did) respond to reflect your assessment of how you believe you used each of the 
processing rules in determining the role of attribute x1 : 
E_α   E_β    E_γ   E_ε   E_η 
• I definitely ignored (IG) x1                ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
• I did not fully ignore, or fully not ignore {IG,NIG}, x1    ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
• I definitely did not ignore (NIG) x1        ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 100   100   100   100   100 
 
These heuristics may be randomly assigned to each respondent, or all might be assigned to each 
respondent (in a randomised order). There are some clear (cognitive) disadvantages of assigning 
all heuristics to each respondent, yet this may be necessary in order to obtain the required data 
to calculate a plausibility expression. It might also be of interest to have eache respondent rank 
the heuristics in order of applicability (in the example above, this is a rank from 1 to 5, where 1 
= most applicable). 
If the focus is on whether an attribute x1 was ignored or not, then we might identify the 
following evidence: 
 
E_α: E_α(IG) = 0.4, E_α(NIG) =  0.2, E_α({IG,NIG})  = 0.4;  rank = 4 
E_β: E_β (IG) = 0.4, E_β (NIG) = 0.3, E_β ({IG,NIG}) = 0.3;  rank =  3 
E_γ: E_γ (IG)  = 0.5, E_γ (NIG) =  0.3, E_γ ({IG,NIG})  = 0.2;  rank = 2 (31) 
E_ε: E_ε (IG)  = 0.3, E_ε (NIG) =  0.3, E_ε ({IG,NIG})  = 0.6;  rank = 5 
E_η: E_η (IG) = 0.5, E_η (NIG) = 0.2, E_η ({IG,NIG}) = 0.3;  rank = 1 
 
The responses to (31) can be fed into equation (28) to obtain the belief and plausibility values in (29) and 
(30), which can then be interacted in a choice model (for ordered or unordered alternatives), with each 
attribute and/or the scale parameters to account for the attribute processing strategy of each respondent at 
an alternative and at a choice set level37. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper brings together an accumulating set of interesting processing rules that are 
hypothesised to be applied, to varying degrees, by respondents in assessing choice scenarios in 
choice experiments. The rules are ways of cognitively rationalising the information on offer in 
order to make a choice. The paper synthesises the empirical evidence presented in Layton and 
Hensher (2008), Hensher and Layton (2008), Hensher and Rose (in press), and Hensher and 
Greene (2008), and offers new evidence to support the view that failure to identify and account 
for process heterogeneity tends to result in potentially significant differences in the marginal 
willingness to pay for travel time savings. If this evidence accumulates, and is shown to be 
applicable to a wider set of marginal willingness to pay attributes and contexts, then we should 
be concerned about the standard evidence, especially in an economic appraisal and demand 
forecasting context.  
The paper also draws on a literature not connected to discrete choice analysis that recognizes the 
errors of response in qualitative questions typically used to establish the presence of a specific 
processing rule. Although we have no new empirical evidence to quantify the notion of 
believability and plausibility associated with the Dempster-Shafer belief function, the approach 
to discounting self-stated explication on how attributes are processed is appealing, and worthy 
of investigation. 
In ongoing research, we are investigating additional heuristics, including alternative functional 
forms for the heuristics herein, and ways of combining more than two heuristics into a single 
choice model that enable each heuristic to evolve up to a probability as continuum across a 
                                                          
37 A way of accounting for the rank order requires ongoing research. 
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sampled population and /or across observations obtained from the same individuals (as is a 
panel such as a set of choice scenarios in a stated choice experiment). Another topic of especial 
interest is the relationship between WTP findings from self-stated intentions and specific 
functional forms of utility expressions. The evidence to date, from both sources, is not 
supportive empirically of the other in terms of the magnitude of marginal WTP relative to the 
simple fully compensatory linear model. The roles of both approaches are yet to be clarified. 
Tangential to the current study is the growing literature on hypothetical bias in stated choice 
studies, which suggests that the marginal WTP (MWTP) is under-estimated for VTTS in stated 
choice studies, compared to actual market-based evidence, possibly by as much as 50 percent 
(see Brownstone and Small 2005, and Hensher 2008a). Isacsson (2007), in the context of 
trading time with money, found that the MWTP based on a hypothetical experiment was almost 
50 percent lower at the mean than the real experiment MWTP, supporting the conclusions by 
Brownstone and Small (2005), in a transport context, that “…the value of time saved on the 
morning commute is quite high (between $20 and $40 per hour) when based on revealed 
behavior, and less than half that amount when based on hypothetical behavior” (page 279). It 
may be that the failure to accommodate process heterogeneity is a significant contributing 
influence. 
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